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ON THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF LIFE AND 
NARRATIVE IN THE LAST OF THE JUST
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Abstract
This article explores André Schwarz-Bart’s famous novel, The Last 
of the Just, as the expression of twin crises in literary and religious 
representation. Ernie Levy’s words, ‘there is no room for truth here’, 
spoken on the transport to Auschwitz as he cradles and comforts a dying 
child with stories of an idyllic afterlife, become the point of departure for 
a reading of the novel in terms of the loss of just this ‘room for truth’. 
The article considers the novel’s reimagining of the legend of the Lamed 
Vav in the light of Gershom Scholem’s criticism that Schwarz-Bart 
compromises the legend’s ‘moral anarchy’ before casting the novel in 
the light of Freud’s remarks on traumatic dreams in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, as well as Emmanuel Levinas’ ideas on ‘useless suffering’. 
The last part of the article reads the novel’s anguished theological motifs 
alongside Paul Celan’s poem ‘Psalm’.
‘Madame . . . there is no room for truth here’ (366).1 Thus Ernie Levy’s 
response to the enraged reproach of the doctor on the transport to Auschwitz, 
‘How can you tell them it’s only a dream?’ The children dying in the fetid, 
freezing, corpse-strewn car grope desperately for the comfort of Ernie’s 
reassurance that they are approaching the ‘Kingdom of Israel’, where ‘the sun 
never sets, and you can eat anything that comes to mind. . . . Happiness and 
joy will come to you, and pain and lamentation will flee’ (365). The doctor’s 
response to Ernie closes the sub-chapter. ‘Then you don’t believe what you’re 
saying? Not at all?’, she asks rhetorically before releasing ‘a short, terrified, 
demented laugh’ (366).
The movement of this brief and terrible exchange is entropic. It begins 
with a redemptive fantasy offered to bind the terrifying incoherence of the 
dying child’s inner experience, to offer it the comforts of some rudimentary 
narrative shape. It ends with the doctor’s ‘short, terrified, demented laugh’; 
that is, with the wordless noise of meaning itself falling into the abyss. 
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Between the reassuring story and the demented laugh, the already precarious 
binding of mind and spirit decisively falls away.
Perhaps this is an implicit representation of the predicament of the novel 
itself. Its narrative vehicle, after all, is a religious legend which imagines 
thirty-six Just Men as the fragile membrane barely separating the world from 
its own collapse. The doctor’s demented laugh is the sound of this membrane 
dissolving, of the mind losing the binding force that holds it together. Meaning 
and coherence in the Auschwitz railcar are possible only in the form a fanciful, 
brazenly fabricated children’s story.
What Gershom Scholem calls the ‘anarchic morality’ of the original 
conception of the hidden Just Men is linked, I think, to this fragility. Scholem, 
however, is rather sceptical of the novel’s use of the legend. ‘The hidden 
just man’, he writes, ‘– if he is anything at all – is your neighbour and mine 
whose true nature we can never fathom’ (Scholem 1995: 256). Justice, in 
this conception, has no determinate place or embodiment. It is not so much a 
substantial reality as a spectral, fleeting possibility, at once everywhere and 
nowhere. Schwarz-Bart’s imaginative rewriting of the tradition as one of 
paternal inheritance – ‘and conscious at that!’ – suggests Scholem in a subtly 
implicit reproach, rather compromises this anarchic morality.
On the face of it, Scholem is surely right on this point. Where the 
sources of the legend suggest that the status of Just Man is unknown even 
to the lamedvovniks themselves, Schwarz-Bart’s version has it transmitted 
knowingly down the generations of a single family. But moral anarchy and 
ambiguity do not quite disappear with this new rendering. On the contrary, in 
limiting the candidates for Just Man status, Schwarz-Bart opens up new vistas 
of doubt.
The arrival of Chaim Levy in eighteenth-century Zemyock will lead to 
widespread scepticism towards the claims of the Levy dynasty when he fails 
to honour the tradition of the Lamed Vav siring a single son before dutifully 
passing away. His wife’s second pregnancy raises doubts, in others as to which 
of his two sons ‘will be the Lamed-Vovnik’, and in himself as to whether he 
himself is one at all: ‘I have never received any confirmation from within, 
not the least sign, no voice telling me that I am a Lamed-Vovnik. . . . Have I 
accomplished miracles for you? All I wanted was a wheelbarrow’ (29).
If this were not enough, Chaim adds ‘a few daughters’ and three more sons 
to his legacy, the last of which, ‘a pagan, an imbecile, an authentic slemazl’ 
(30) known as Brother Beast, he will announce with a certain vindictive 
irony on his deathbed as the next Just Man. And so Scholem’s suggestion 
that Schwarz-Bart divests the legend of its moral anarchy becomes a little 
less clear-cut. The effect of localizing the transmission of the title in a family 
is more ambiguous than Scholem implies. Yes, it means the loss of the 
enigma conferred by the hiddenness of the Just Men. But in making the title a 
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conscious inheritance, Schwarz-Bart opens up a more radical doubt: if Chaim 
and Brother Beast seem so brazenly to contradict the terms of the inheritance, 
perhaps there is no inheritance, nor any Just Man.
The moral anarchy of the original sources as traced by Scholem – the Just 
Man as at once everywhere and nowhere – is consistent with a particular strain 
in monotheistic theology. The Just Man’s presence, like God’s, is revealed in 
remaining concealed. The hidden Just Man clearly evokes the concealment 
of God in the world – the susceptibility of each to doubt, we might say, is 
a paradoxical guarantee of their ultimate truth – whereas Schwarz-Bart’s 
Just Man is more vulnerable to the threat of atheism, to scepticism regarding 
any founding justice, to the blasphemous whisper that all this is just a story 
desperate people tell themselves when there’s no ‘room for truth’.
Schwarz-Bart’s novel explores the predicament of finding, and not finding, 
‘room for truth’, the ways religious tradition seeks to and fails to bind the 
incomprehension induced by human experience. This is what makes it so 
interesting for psychoanalysis, which is also concerned with the devices we 
resort to when our experience becomes obscure to us; when self-knowledge 
fails us. 
From the very beginning of the novel, in other words, we are alerted to a 
kind of dissonance between experience and the stories with which we seek to 
organize it. By casting into doubt the very notion of the transmission of justice 
it ostensibly narrates, the novel raises the question of whether experience does 
not always exceed the forms we seek to impose on it. 
This, surely, is what Adorno is gesturing towards in his well-worn and 
misunderstood dictum that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’ 
(Adorno 1983: 34). With this statement Adorno announces not an interdiction 
on art, but the imperative for art to incorporate into itself a consciousness of 
its own barbarism. Put another way, there is a kind of obscenity in any claim 
to have found an adequate form, aesthetic or religious, for the extremities of 
human cruelty and suffering. There is no room for the truth of Auschwitz in 
the fixed forms of religious or literary tradition.
In this sense the novel is a risky choice, and a brave one I think, for a 
trialogue between literature, religion and psychotherapy, insofar as it threatens 
to exhaust or exceed the resources of all of them; to put in question the capacity 
of any of these modes of thinking and practice to say anything about them 
at all. It is a form that seems to employ traditions of literary and religious 
representation, but that puts unbearable strain on both these traditions.
And what of psychoanalysis? We are all aware of the hubris of which 
psychoanalysis is accused, not always unjustifiably, when it seeks to ‘explain’ 
works of art in terms of psychobiography, symptomatology or psychic 
mechanisms. How much more vulnerable is it to such charges, then, in the 
face of a novel giving voice to experiences which radically defy explanation?
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On the other hand, if psychoanalysis has anything to say here, it is because 
it is a theory and practice that begins from its own limits. At its centre, to state 
the obvious, is the phenomenon of unconscious life, a force which withdraws 
from all attempts to subject it to the discipline of concepts. This, perhaps, is 
its deepest affinity with its interlocutors in this trialogue. Literature, religion 
and psychoanalysis all live in the painful consciousness that the experiences 
they seek to represent, to confer symbolic, narrative and conceptual meanings 
upon, are liable to corrode all such attempts.
Suffering is, of course, the exemplary problem here. We subject it to 
psychoanalytic inquiry, literary representation or religious reflection as though 
it could yield some meaning; as though we could find the forms to make 
room for its truth. But what if its truth is that it is, to invoke both an essay by 
Emmanuel Levinas and the words of Mordecai Levy in the novel, useless, 
unassimilable to any religious or historical narrative that could redeem it? 
‘What good’, demands the anguished Mordecai, ‘is suffering that does not 
glorify the name? Why all the useless persecutions?’ (267). Useless suffering, 
writes Levinas in his essay of that title (2006), is suffering which refuses to 
be redeemed, that cannot be made the object of some sacrificial calculus. It is, 
you could say, the source of the doctor’s demented laughter at the end of the 
novel, the realization that the outer edges psychic and physical pain exhaust 
all the stories we can tell about it, ‘bringing about’, in the words of Elaine 
Scarry (1988), ‘an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the 
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned’.
Psychoanalysis has its own language for useless suffering, which first finds 
explicit expression in Freud’s famous theory of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (Freud 2001a), and in particular his insights into the dreams of 
traumatized war veterans. Psychoanalysis is founded, of course, on a theory 
of dreaming. Dreams, Freud posits in the foundational text of psychoanalytic 
theory, are hallucinatory fulfilments of unconscious wishes. Put another way, 
dreams give form to the internal forces that threaten to disturb us, to undo 
our psychic equilibrium, and the primary function of these forms is to protect 
the state of sleep. Dreams give rudimentary narrative and pictorial form to 
thoughts and feelings which, in the absence of such forms, might break the 
barrier separating sleep from wakefulness.
Lindsey Stonebridge’s resonant notion of a ‘novel that makes us dream’, 
however, points both to this protective function of dreams and to a different, 
later sense of the dream in Freud as a traumatic intrusion into the sleeper’s 
psychic space. Certainly, and inevitably, the conversations and discussions I 
have heard and participated in over the course of the trialogue have confirmed 
this disturbing experience of the novel.
Instead of providing the sleeping mind with an adequate representation 
of the traumatic experience, says Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
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‘dreams in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing 
the patient back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he 
wakes up in another fright’ (Freud 2001: 18). This phenomenon, in which 
the dream tasked with guarding sleep instead destroys it, continues Freud, 
‘astonishes people far too little’ (Freud 2001: 13). 
But what is it that is so astonishing here? It is that trauma has the capacity 
to disable and invert the very function of dreams. Dreams protect sleep by 
finding adequate unconscious forms for the most disturbing extremities of 
our psychic reality. Traumatic dreams reveal that there are experiences for 
which no adequate unconscious form can be found. It is hard not to associate 
here to the French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard’s famous figuring of 
Auschwitz as an earthquake that destroys all instruments of measurement 
(Lyotard 1989: 56).
But Lyotard’s figure provokes in turn another association which might at 
first seem peculiarly oblique, to the French Psychosomatic School whose first 
major contributions, by the likes of Michel Fain, Pierre Marty and Michel de 
M’Uzan, were published during the 1960s. Rooted in the clinical treatment of 
patients who expressed themselves through disturbingly inarticulate somatic 
phenomena, the theories of the Psychosomatic School pose a major challenge 
to traditional psychoanalytic theory. 
Psychoanalysis, as its name intimates, assumes that the psyche being 
analysed has found some representational form, however rudimentary, for its 
suffering, whether in the form of a dream, a symptom or some other form 
of mental or bodily activity. In his brief but very densely concentrated essay 
of 1968 on ‘Progressive Disorganization’, Pierre Marty describes a form of 
somatizing activity in which the body is forced to take on the burden of what 
the psyche is unable to process. This psyche has been subjected to traumas 
in its earliest life that have destroyed its ‘libidinal defences’, that is, its basic 
investments in the life process. The result is a psyche that has no capacity 
to bind its experiences in meaningful representations, a task which falls 
by default to the body, which thereby becomes subject to a ‘progressive 
disorganization’ which ‘removes the delicate libidinal systems which precede 
it, giving way to the functional destruction of the subject. The unconscious 
becomes practically isolated, cut off from preconscious activities as well as 
from manifest behaviour’ (Marty 1968: 248).
What makes Marty’s reflections relevant here, I suggest, is their 
description of what happens when experience falls out of the range of psychic 
representation, when it is drained of even the most basic psychic meaning 
– this, surely, is the predicament Ernie is left with in the car to Auschwitz. 
And is this not what Mordecai is alluding to when he laments ‘such useless 
persecutions’, ‘suffering that does not serve to glorify the Name’? (267). In 
very different words, suffering that destroys the very libidinal defences that 
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would invest them with meaning, and so can find no psychic form to contain 
it.
One objection that immediately comes to mind here is that Schwarz-
Bart’s novel can hardly be described in these terms, teeming so richly and 
expansively in representations, and especially in figures from nature and 
religion. Schwarz-Bart is hardly Beckett or Celan, poets of the imagination’s 
radical exhaustion, of poetry’s impossibility. Nonetheless, the most striking 
aspect of the novel’s imagery and narrative motifs is that they stage a kind 
of perpetual struggle to preserve the capacity of an imagination which is 
increasingly under threat of ‘disorganization’ in precisely Marty’s sense of 
‘the functional destruction of the subject’. 
I want to digress briefly into a poem by Paul Celan. More than any other 
poet, Celan sounds the abyssal depths of the survivor’s traumatized inner 
landscape, and of the shattering of the religious imagination. The poem I want 
to cite is called ‘Psalm’ (Celan 1996: 179):
No one moulds us again out of earth and clay,
no one conjures our dust.
No one.
Praised be your name, no one.
For your sake 
we shall flower.
Towards you.
‘The negative of him is more real than the positive of you’, a war-traumatized 
patient tells Donald Winnicott (1971: 23), suggesting her previous analyst’s 
absence is more palpable than his living presence. You can hear the echo of 
her plaintive, melancholy rage, transposed to the cosmic plane of theology, 
in these opening stanzas of Celan’s 1963 poem. If the Biblical Psalmist is 
a flower reaching out of the dark in certain hope of finding the infinitely 
nourishing and protective light of Someone, Celan’s Psalmist gropes instead 
in the blind despair of a fall into the void of No one. Perhaps this is the state of 
‘unthinkable anxiety’ into which, according to Winnicott, the youngest infant 
is thrown when made to experience her own helplessness. The more she intuits 
the absence of a mother’s form-giving psychic and bodily hold, the more she 
is liable to internal disintegration, experienced as a fatally vertiginous ‘falling 
for ever’ (Winnicott 1962: 58).
‘A nothing / we were, are, shall / remain, flowering: / the nothing-, the / no 
one’s rose’, runs Celan’s next stanza. To be held by the void is to be voided, 
drained of substance, a nothing-flower (Die Niemandsrose is the volume in 
which ‘Psalm’ appears) raised and cultivated by ‘no one’. And yet this ‘no 
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one’s rose’ flowers nonetheless, like an infant consigned to seek and find only 
‘no one’, to an eternal reiteration of her own helplessness.
The function of religion, writes Freud in his most polemical treatment of 
the subject, The Future of an Illusion, is to arm a human being with ‘a store of 
ideas . . . built up from the material and memories of the helplessness of . . . 
childhood’, against the terrifying anonymity and indifference of the universe, 
and so ‘to make his helplessness tolerable’ (Freud 2001b: 18). 
There is an obvious way in which Freud anticipates here the New Atheist 
assault on religion as infantile consolation, a clinging to magical thinking in 
defiance of the intolerably harsh truths of the external (or grown-up) world. And 
yet, there is an important difference between Richard Dawkins’ ‘delusional’ 
and Freud’s ‘illusory’ religion. A delusion is a wholesale and systematic 
distortion, a screen of untruth blocking the mind’s capacity to perceive reality. 
An illusion, on the other hand, is an essential element in apprehending reality. 
Religious illusion, Freud is suggesting, is psychically if not externally real, an 
organic outgrowth of the experience of childhood helplessness, rather than an 
elaborate contrivance aimed at shielding you from it.
Which is not, of course, to deny that religion has a lion’s share in the 
store of omnipotent fantasies through which the self seeks to conjure away 
its original helplessness. But is there a more compelling attestation to 
Winnicott’s insight into the secret, collusive intimacy between omnipotence 
and helplessness than the great texts of religious tradition? The Biblical 
Psalmist calls min hametzar, de profundis, ‘out of the depths’, with the loved 
child’s untroubled faith in finding the infinitely protective hand of Someone: 
‘The LORD is for me among those who help me’, declares Psalm 118. But is 
not this anticipation of divine help tacitly conditioned and forever haunted by 
the spectre of helplessness, by the abyssal terror of reaching out and finding 
only nothingness, of ‘flowering towards no one’? Apparently opposed, the 
Biblical Psalmist and Celan are precariously close to one another. The positive 
religious scenario of the creature under the protection of a loving God has a 
clandestine companion in its own negative, the Protector turned Abandoner, 
Torturer and Destroyer.
In a brief essay from his collection Other People’s Trades called ‘On 
Obscure Writing’, Primo Levi takes Celan as an exemplar of a tendency, 
indicated in his title, that he ordinarily deplores. ‘We must not write as 
if we were living alone’, writes Levi (1989: 174), suggesting the obscure 
writer has sunk irresponsibly into the hermetic retreat of his private self. 
The essay is a caution to his fellow writers against this kind of descent 
into obscurity, and an appeal to preserve the humanist project of shared 
understanding.
However, there are times, Levi concedes, when obscurity is less the effect of 
wilful mystification than that of irreparable damage. Celan, his contemporary, 
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writes out of the shadows of ‘German slaughter’ and his lyric obscurity must 
be ascribed neither to contempt nor to ineptitude, but to ‘the obscurity of his 
fate and generation’, which ‘grows ever denser around the reader’. Celan, 
Levi concludes, must be pitied rather than imitated, as one stripped of the 
faculty of communicative language and left with its exhausted husk, ‘a dark 
and truncated language like that of a person who is about to die and is alone, 
as we all will be at the point of death’ (Levi 1989: 173–174). Do we not find 
here an evocation of Celan’s helplessly abandoned Psalmist?
Levi is writing out of a barely concealed rage and terror, a presentiment of 
a self imprisoned in its own private language, closed off to the world, a state 
of being that evokes what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in his 
Remnants of Auschwitz, calls ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1999). Bare life, a concept 
he introduces in his earlier work Homo Sacer, is life reduced to its elemental 
biological facticity, deprived of the basic forms that would make it life in the 
ordinary sense. It is life stripped of the possibility of thought, a destruction 
of the mind’s investment in itself and the world. ‘Thought’, Agamben writes 
in a short essay called ‘Form-of Life’, ‘is “form-of-life”, life that cannot be 
segregated from its forms’ (Agamben 2000: 10).
For Agamben, Auschwitz is the devastation of life as form-of-life, insofar 
as its project is precisely to segregate life from its forms; to expose the 
helpless bareness of life. ‘Auschwitz’, he writes, ‘is the site of an experiment 
that remains unthought today, an experiment beyond life and death in which 
the Jew is transformed into a Musselman and the human being into a non-
human’ (Agamben 1999: 52). In other words, the categories that endow the 
human with her humanity are forcibly and sadistically removed in the camps. 
The human being is reduced to a kind of zero state, a living death, in which 
terms such as dignity and respect and the very notion of an ethical limit lose 
their meaning.
Returning to The Last of the Just in the light of these reflections, I am 
struck by how insistently the novel evokes the threshold of this zero state. 
Life is increasingly experienced by Ernie as a progressive deprivation of its 
basic forms. Perhaps this is why motifs of animal life are so pervasive in 
the novel. 
We can think in this regard of the terrible ‘fly’ passage so powerfully 
discussed by Michael Parsons in his opening address. Enclosed in the hollow 
of his hand, the fly discloses itself to Ernie from the depths of its precarious 
life: 
He felt sympathy for the jolts and jerks convulsing that small particle of 
existence. . . . Bringing the miserable jewel closer to his eyes, the child 
was ravished by the minute arrangement of the antennae, which he was 
noticing for the first time. Those fine filaments, they too were trembling 
in the gusts of the interior storm. Ernie shivered in grief. (195)
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Ernie’s encounter with the trembling filaments of the fly’s physical and interior 
life, with its irreducible fear of death, is a kind of melancholy epiphany, a 
revelation of himself as a ‘Just Man for the flies’ – that is, for the terrorized 
lives trembling at the threshold of existence and non-existence; for those 
deprived of the capacity to represent their terror in a language which would 
confer the comfort of intelligibility.
Is it not the wordless voice of this terrorized life we hear in the howl, ‘the 
beast-a-booming’ rising ‘to the little boy’s throat’ (234) at the moment the 
Pimpfe’s ringleader Hans Schliemann jerks down Ernie’s pants and uncovers 
his sex – removing the boundary between, to invoke Agamben once more, 
formed life and bare life, or more simply, human and animal life – anticipating 
those piled corpses, perhaps, whose nakedness has been ripped out of the 
opposition between the clothed and the naked.
The moment anticipates not only the sequence of insect ‘murders’ and 
attempted suicide, but the moment of waking from his near death, seeing from 
only one eye, through which he finds himself discovering 
not only the forms and colours of the world but also its eminent cruelty. 
In his initial surprise, Ernie thought that God had withdrawn himself 
from things, all of which now stood colourless, dimensionless, like cast-
off clothing thrown at random into the halls of the hospital. Then he 
understood that he was no longer seeing them with the lying eyes of the 
soul. (256)
Notice, then, the rhyme of Ernie’s humiliation, the casting-off of his 
underwear, with the universal casting-off of the world’s forms. Seen through 
this one pitiless eye, the world is a repository of naked life, a cosmic reflection 
of his proclamation as he sets about killing the insects: ‘I am nothing’ (239).
We are inside the darkness of Celan’s Psalm: ‘A nothing / we were, are, 
shall / remain, flowering: the nothing-, the / no one’s rose’, a God-forsaken 
world whose forms are thereby revealed as a kind of obscenely comic trompe 
l’oeil – a cheating of the eye that would prefer to die than be cheated.
What I have been trying to do here is ask what narrative options we have in 
the face of life reduced to the attenuated pulsation of the caught fly – whose 
‘jolts and jerks’ will come to be rhymed later on with the ‘spasms’ of the dying 
children in the car to Auschwitz. Schwarz-Bart’s novel can be read as an 
anguished, unresolved response to this question; a struggle to find a religious, 
aesthetic and emotional form for the pitiless formlessness of naked life. All 
narrative forms seem to unravel under the unbearable strain of this attenuated 
pulsation, in short to fail. And yet in this necessary failure, this life reduced 
to animal formlessness is made visible and audible to us through what the 
last words of the novel name as ‘only a presence’ (379). This presence is 
imperceptible, even in the form of a ‘breeze in the air’ or a ‘cloud in the sky’ 
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– and yet it is also palpable if we are prepared to listen attentively to what 
usually passes our ears – the buzz of a fly, for example.
It is this formless presence of naked life that should be recalled, which 
Emmanuel Levinas associates with the human face – with the Other in her 
absolute, commanding vulnerability, the Other to whom I’m infinitely obliged 
precisely because I can murder her. The face in Levinas has in this sense 
much in common with Ernie’s fly – the precariousness of life without form. 
This of course is what the analyst is always listening for, regardless of what 
he might think he is listening for – the silent presence of a suffering that lurks 
inside the patient’s words; a silence that so disturbs Levi and all of us. If 
this novel communicates to psychoanalysis and to psychotherapy, it is not so 
much because of its specific content as in the way it teaches us – and Lyndsey 
Stonebridge’s words regarding the excruciating slowness of the prose’s 
texture come to mind here – to listen to that presence. ‘Only a presence’.
Note
1. All page references are to Schwarz-Bart (2001).
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